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size of jury verdicts"; 9 "we do think the stage has now been reached
where juries are more mature."40 This author is forced to conclude
that when the court in Shingleton spoke of a "candid admission at trial
of the existence of insurance coverage,"41 as opposed to "the questionable
'ostrich in the sand' approach,"4 2 it was dealing with the substantive
question of whether or not insurance coverage is a subject for the jury's
knowledge. Accordingly, the court has been inconsistent in its rulings
in Shingleton and Beta Eta.
It is this author's opinion, that regardless of the intent of the court
in Beta Eta, the effect of its decision will be, for all practical purposes,
to override Shingleton. It is unfortunate that the State of Florida ap-
parently will return "to the present rule of non-disclosure--a rule which
is not only a fruitful source of controversy, but fails completely to ac-
complish its purpose."4 3
STEPHEN T. BROWN
STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUIT: PLAINTIFFS'
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
Plaintiffs, stockholders of a closed-end mutual fund, brought a
derivative action in the Federal District Court for the Southern District
of New York, naming as defendants the corporation's board of directors
and an investment banking firm which acted as the corporation's stock
broker.' Both the directors and the broker were accused of breaching the
fiduciary duty owed by each to the corporate fund. The broker, some of
whose partners comprised a portion of the corporation's board of directors,
was also alleged to have thereby violated the Investment Company Act
of 1940.2 This control by the broker was alleged to have been used for
the purpose of extracting from the corporation unusually high brokerage
fees. Allegations against the directors individually, asserted that they had
converted corporate assets and were guilty of "gross abuse of trust,
gross misconduct, willful misfeasance, bad faith," and "gross negligence."
The plaintiffs' complaint requested an accounting of the alleged excess
profits received by the broker and of the resulting losses to the corpora-
tion and also demanded a jury trial. The defendant's motion to strike




43. Note, Permissive Joinder As A Substitute for Excluding Evidence that Defendant is
Insured, 59 YALE: L.J. 1160, 1167 (1950).
1. Ross v. Bernhard, 275 F. Supp. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80(a) 1 et seq. (1964).
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the demand for a jury trial was dismissed. An interlocutory appeal
followed, and the decision of the district court was reversed.' On certio-
rari to the United States Supreme Court held, reversed: Neither the fact
that a stockholder's right to a derivative action is founded in equity, nor
the fact that the stockholder demands the equitable relief of accounting,
will deprive him of the right to a jury trial so long as the underlying
facts, as alleged, would give the corporation a cause of action at common
law and some money damages are requested. Ross v. Bernhard, 90 S.
Ct. 733 (1970).
As early as Dodge v. Woolsey,4 the United States Supreme Court
recognized the stockholders' derivative action. One stockholder was al-
lowed to bring an action for the purpose of barring the collection of a tax
alleged to be unconstitutionally levied against the corporation. The court
concluded that a bill in equity would lie against the corporation when
brought by one of its members, provided that the member alleged a
breach of the fiduciary relationship existing between the corporation and
its directors. Later, Hawes v. Oakland' added two important limitations
to this doctrine: The stockholder's right to a bill in equity must be
founded on a right of action existing in the corporation itself and he
must have exhausted all reasonable means within the corporation to
obtain redress of his grievances.
In 1916, the defendants in a stockholders' derivative action made a
demand for a jury trial.' The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Holmes, affirmed the lower court's dismissal of their suit. He reasoned
that since the plaintiff was requesting triple damages under the Sherman
Act and since the act extended the right to a jury trial to defendants sued
thereunder, no action under the statute could be maintained in equity.
Here was a clear directive by the Supreme Court that a derivative action
is only maintainable in equity, and because of this, there is no right to a
jury trial. A few months later, in another case under the Sherman Act,
stockholders sought relief on behalf of their corporation without alleging
any of the elements necessary to give equity jurisdiction; i.e., they re-
quested relief at law.7 The court answered emphatically that "their
remedy is not at law."'
The above case, United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated
Copper Co., was cited to the same effect in Goetz v. Manufacturers &
Traders' Trust Co.,9 wherein the plaintiffs in a stockholders' derivative
suit requested a jury trial. Their request was denied because "the action,
3. Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
4. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855). See generally Note, The Shareholders' Derivative
Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 980 (1957).
5. 104 U.S. 450 (1881). See also House v. Cooper, 30 Barb. 157 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1858);
Vanderbilt v. Garrison, 12 N.Y. Super. Ct. (5 Duer) 689 (1856).
6. Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916).
7. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
8. Id. at 264 (footnote omitted).
9. 154 Misc. 733, 277 N.Y.S. 802 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
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being brought ... is not one that falls within the constitutional assurance
of jury trial .... " but instead "is one that arose through the application
of equitable rules by courts of chancery .... ,o
Ironically, Richland v. Crandall," one of the last in the long line of
decisions denying a jury trial in derivative actions, was decided by the
same district court trying the instant case, but with the opposite result,
not 13 months earlier. In Richland, the plaintiffs sought relief, both
derivatively as well as on their own behalf, requesting in each instance
that the issues of fact be tried to a jury. To the extent that they desired
their own recovery, a jury was allowed, but as to issues bearing only on
the derivative portion of the suit the court stated:
Historically a stockholders' derivative suit has always been
one exclusively in equity, even when instituted for the purpose
of enforcing, in whole or in part, a corporation's legal claim.
The Dairy Queen doctrine does not entitle a derivative
stockholder to a jury trial. An essential condition to the invoca-
tion of that doctrine is the requirement that plaintiffs state a
legal claim (whether or not joined with equitable claims) which
they could make the subject of a suit at common law, either at
the present time or before the adoption in 1938 of Rule 18(a)
F.R.C.P. permitting joinder of legal and equitable claims in
one civil action. A derivative action could never be brought as a
'Suit at common law.' Even though it asserts what would be
legal claims if asserted by the corporation, it has always been
exclusively a suit in equity. Since it could not be brought at
common law, it could not meet the test laid down by the
Seventh Amendment.' 2
Another stream of thought with regard to the jury's place in equi-
table proceedings grew up simultaneously with the concept previously
discussed. The genesis of this diverging line of reasoning was originally
expressed in Parsons v. Bedford,13 wherein the seventh amendment right
to a jury trial was appraised.
When, therefore, we find, that the amendment requires that the
right of trial by jury shall [be] preserved, in suits at common
law, the natural conclusion is, that this distinction was present
to the minds of the framers of the amendment. By common
law, they meant what the constitution denominated in the third
article 'law'; not merely suits, which the common law recog-
nized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which
legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contra-
10. Id. at 803.
11. 259 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
12. Id. at 279 (footnotes omitted).
13. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 266 (1830).
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distinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized,
and equitable remedies were administered .... 14
Thus, it appears that the nature of the remedy requested, rather than the
"form" of the action in which it is requested, should be the criterion for
determining the existence of a right to a jury trial. This dictum, which
went far beyond the scope of the case, until recently found little sup-
port in the law.
With the adoption of the federal rules of procedure in 1938, the way
was paved for legal and equitable issues to be tried simultaneously. "The
distinction between law and equity, although abolished by the new rules,
is a distinction in procedure and not remedies. What was, before the new
rules, an action at law is a jury action and what was a suit in equity is
a non-jury action."'" This change in policy had its effect on the derivative
action under the antitrust laws so that an entirely opposite result than
that reached in the earlier case of Fleitman v. Welsbach Street Lighting
Company"6 was obtained in Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc.'7
The two major issues of right of the shareholder to sue and of
violation of the anti-trust laws causing damage to the corpora-
tion can be tried side by side or otherwise as may be convenient;
that one may go to the jury while the other does not causes no
difficulty.'"
It should be noted that in Fanchon & Marco it was the defendant's right
to a jury trial that was in issue. Furthermore, the defendant was entitled
to a jury trial by statute so that the stockholder plaintiff, of necessity,
had to show that the defendant's jury right was not inconsistent with his
(the shareholder's) equitable right to sue under the same statute on behalf
of the corporation. Fanchon & Marco made it possible for shareholders
to sue on behalf of the corporation in antitrust cases, but the question of
the plaintiff's right to a jury in derivative suits, not based on the antitrust
statutes, still remained answered in the negative.
Five years later, in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 9 the counter-
plaintiff was awarded a jury trial as to issues that were coincidental to
his counterclaim as well as to the plaintiff's equitable request for an
injunction. The trial court, with the court of appeals affirming, sought to
try all issues bearing on the equitable relief to the court, leaving the
residue to the jury when the antitrust question was litigated. Fearing that
14. Id. at 275 (emphasis added).
15. Ryan Distributing Corp. v. Caley, 51 F. Supp. 377, 379 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
16. 240 U.S. 27 (1916).
17. 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953). See also Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297
(3d Cir. 1962).
18. Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir.
1953).
19. 359 U.S. 500 (1959); cf. Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106 (1891).
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this course could bar the counterplaintiff from having all the issues bear-
ing on the antitrust claim tried before a jury, due to the operation of the
doctrine of "collateral estoppel," the Supreme Court required that the
legal claim be tried first saying:
[T]he justification for equity's deciding legal issues once it
obtains jurisdiction, and refusing to dismiss a case, merely be-
cause subsequently a legal remedy becomes available, must be
re-evaluated in light of the liberal joinder provisions of the
Federal Rules which allow legal and equitable causes to be
brought and resolved in one civil action .... 20
[OInly under the most imperative circumstances . . . can
the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior
determination of equitable claims."
Going one step further than Beacon is Dairy Queen Inc. v. Wood,22
wherein defenses p~urelv legal in nature were asserted against a claim for
equitable relief. The Sunreme Court held that the issues relevant to the
legal defense could not be considered "incidental" to the equitable issues
involved in the claim and must be tried to a jury before the remaining
factual questions may be considered by the court.
Moving still fnrther in this direction was the high court's decision in
Simler v. Conner.23 There. the plaintiff, seeking the equitable relief of a
declaratory iudgment to determine the amount of fees owed to his lawyer
on a contingent-fee retainer contract, was entitled to have all the isqiues
tried to a iiirv. The holding distinmished the form of the action which
was enuitable and the essentiallir legal nature of the underlying claim.
Seven monthi later. in DePinto v. Provident Security Life Insurance
Cormanv.24 the Ninth Circuit held that the p)laintiff in a shareholder's
derivative suit was entitled to a iurv trial to the extent that the ninderlv-
in r cornorste claim was legal. Here. the distinction was drawn between
l'-P oitable theory which brings the plaintiff into court and the legal
-elief rpiiested on behalf of the cororation. At this point, the two
st-eams of thollght originating in the common reservoir of the seventh
Prn-:ment were flowing in ornosite directions. One tributary led to the
hInlrdin that no right to a jury can accrue to the shareholder in his
d, -ivative suit because without eauitv the suit could never be brought
!, common law. 25 The other anoroach was DePinto v. Provident Security
T.f Iisrance Comrnanv.21 which advanced the orposite viewoint: The
20. TBeacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959) (footnotes omitted).
21. Id. at 510.
22. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). But cf. Wirtz v. Gihso'n Prods. Co., 275 F. Stunn. 86 (W.D.
Okla. 1967). See Doughty v. Nebel Towing Co., 270 F. Supp. 957 (E.D. La. 1967).
23. 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
24..3 F.2d 826 (9tb Cir. 1961).
2.5. Richland v. Crandall, 259 F. Sunrl. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
26. 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1963), rehearing denied,
383 U.S. 973 (1965).
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shareholder, even though dependent solely on equity for a judicial airing
of his grievances, may nonetheless have a jury where the remedy sought
on behalf of the corporation is legal. This was the state of the law when
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the instant case for the purpose
of resolving the conflict.
The Court first established the fact that without question "a corpora-
tion's suit to establish a legal right was an action at common law carrying
the right to jury trial at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted.""
Since law would not recognize any right on the part of the shareholder to
enforce the legal claims of the corporation, equity fashioned the deriva-
tive suit. Thus, the Court, citing Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty
Co.,28 stated that the derivative suit has a dual nature: "first the plain-
tiff's right to sue on behalf of the corporation and second the merits of
the corporation's claim itself.' 29
The proposition enunciated in Simler v. Conner8" provided the next
step in the Court's reasoning process. "The Seventh Amendment ques-
tion depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the char-
acter of the overall action."81 Although the court did not actually
say so, they evidently considered that the question of the plaintiff's
right to sue was the single element which gave the derivative suit the
"overall character of an equitable action." They then reasoned that this
question, though one of standing, was no different than any other equi-
table claim. Since Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen required that when
equitable and legal claims are joined in the same action, the legal claims
go to the jury first then the equitable ones are tried by the court, the same
principle could be applied to the derivative suit. Thus, "the right to a
jury is not forfeited merely because the stockholders' right to sue must
first be adiudicated as an equitable issue triable to the court. 3 2 In other
words, the court broke the derivative suit into two Da-ts, the sha-eholders'
standing to litigate and the underlying corporate claim. The corporate
claim, so separated, would not be tainted by the equitable nature of the
shareholders' standing to litigate. The issues of fact relevant to each could
then be tried separately.
To further substantiate the position that the plaintiff's source of
standing is irrelevant with respect to his right to assert legal issues
before a jury, the court cited with approval several cases awarding jury
trials to nlaintiffs in a class action.88
27. 90 S. Ct. at 735.
28. 330 U.S. 518 (1947); accord, Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288 (1936). But see
United States Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
29. 90 S. Ct. at 736.
30. 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
31. 90 S. Ct. at 738. This proposition is far from novel. The honorable Justice Story
expressed exactly the same idea as dicta over 150 years ago in Parsons v. Bedford, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 266 (1830). See p. 000 & note 14 supra.
32. Ross v. Bernhard, 90 S. Ct. 733, 738 (1970).
33. E.g., Oskoian v. Canuel, 269 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1959); Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Langer, 168 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1948).
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After the rules there is no longer any procedural obstacle to the
assertion of legal rights before juries, however the party may
have acquired standing to assert those rights. Given the avail-
ability in a derivative action of both legal and equitable rem-
edies, we think the Seventh Amendment preserves to the parties
in a stockholder's suit the same right to a jury trial which
historically belonged to the corporation and to those against
whom the corporation pressed its legal claims. 4
In the instant case, the plaintiff shareholders requested money
damages for, among other things, breach of contract on the part of the
corporation's broker and gross negligence on behalf of the board of
directors. Had the corporation brought these two obviously legal claims
in its own name, they would have been triable to a jury. Applying the rule
announced above will require that the issues of fact bearing on the share-
holders' standing85 to litigate on behalf of the corporation be tried to the
judge; i.e., was there a breach of the fiduciary duty, 6 and did the share-
holder make all reasonable attempts to gain redress within the corpora-
tion.87 However, all the remaining issues bearing on the legal claims ad-
vanced on behalf of the corporation must go to a jury since the plaintiff
so desires. 8 Any unresolved issues of fact stemming from equitable
claims made for the corporation are to be referred to the judge after the
preceding legal issues have been handled by the jury. 9
Unfortunately, the decision under consideration can not find much
support in public policy. It is obvious that the majority of these cases will
involve complex issues which will quite possibly be beyond the reach of
the average juror. A judge may find himself forced to administer a class
in business administration before he can charge the jury with its fact-
finding mission. Worse yet, the jurors may not realize that they do not
understand the case and blunder their way through to a verdict which at
best would be an uneducated guess.
Awarding a jury trial will invariably increase the cost of the suit and
lengthen the trial of cases. When considered in the light of the current
cost of a law suit, and the already overburdened dockets of state and
federal courts, the concept of jury trials in derivative suits, as a matter
of right, loses any appeal it may have held for even the most liberal
interpreter of the constitution.
Aside from having little or no basis in policy, the rule does not admit
of easy application. The facts of the case at bar will serve to illustrate
34. 90 S. Ct. at 740.
35. Standing, as used in this note, refers to the shareholders' right to sue for the cor-
poration.
36. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855).
37. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
38. There was dictum to the effect that the defendant could also demand a jury, 90
S. Ct. 733 (1970); cf. Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731
(2d Cir. 1953).
39. 90 S. Ct. 733 (1970); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
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the difficulty. If the trial court considers the question of the shareholder's
standing first, which the Court said it should,4" issues of fact will be
raised with respect to the fiduciary duty toward the corporation. These
issues will, more likely than not, be the same as those bearing on the
corporation's legal claims which in this case are gross negligence of the
directors and breach of a contract negotiated by the corporate fiduciaries.
When these issues are tried to the court to determine standing,4 the
doctrine of "collateral estoppel" will prevent them from later going to the
jury in the trial of the legal cause, thereby creating the very situation the
Supreme Court was so fearful of in Beacon Theatres. The only way to
avoid this dilemma is to try the corporation's legal cause first and then
determine the question of the shareholder's standing to litigate. Such a
procedure would work a grave injustice on the corporate officers who
might be called upon unnecessarily to defend a suit where the share-
holder is later found to be without standing to litigate.
Thus, it appears that the effects of this decision will be undesirable,
and the rule set forth of little practical value. Of course, this alone could
not be used to rationalize the denial of what was found to be a constitu-
tional right. Some flaw must appear in the legal reasoning before criticism
becomes valid. If all of the court's premises are correct, then no flaw is
present. But, it is at least questionable that this is the case. The platform
upon which this decision rests is the supposed dual nature of the deriva-
tive suit. Upset this idea of duality and the concepts of standing to
litigate and the corporate claim will slide together to form one wholly
equitable cause of action. There are several ways that the Court could
have brought about this result.
The dissenting opinion points to one method which looks to the early
history of the derivative suit. That is, derivative actions are in fact suits
to enforce a trust. In Attorney General v. Utica Insurance Company,42
an early action which paved the way for derivative suits, the court
declared that recovery on the part of the shareholder was for the bene-
ficial use "of the company at large." 43 Taken in the light of the trust
concept, the majority view of duality appears incongruous since under
40. "[Tlhe right to a jury is not forfeited merely because the stockholder's right to
sue must first be adjudicated as an equitable issue triable to the court." Ross v. Bernhard,
90 S. Ct. 733, 738 (1970) (emphasis added). "[Tlhe court after passing upon the plain-
tiff's right to sue ...is now able to try the corporate claim ...with the aid of a jury."
Id. at 739 (emphasis added).
41. The Court inferred that all issues of fact pertinent to the question of standing
would be tried to the court, but in DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d
826 (9th Cir. 1963), the court declared that the breach of fiduciary duty question could
go to the jury if based on the common law claim of negligence; cf. Halladay v. Verschoor,
381 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1967).
42. 2 Johns. Ch. 371* (N.Y. Ch. 1817).
43. Id. at 390.* Prunty says: "To read into this language thoughts of a secondary
enforcement of corporate rights is to superimpose a complexity not otherwise apparent."
Note, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980,
989 (1957).
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trust law the legal rights of the trust vest in the trustee (director and
officer of the corporation) and not the corpus itself (corporation).
The second argument militating against the dualized concept of the
derivative suit finds its support in a less scholarly but more practical
foundation. Earlier, it was mentioned that in all probability the majority
of factual issues relevant to the corporate claim would also bear on the
shareholders' standing to litigate. If this be the case, how practical is the
idea that the shareholders' claim is a separate suit from the underlying
corporate claim? In fact, how can the question of standing stand alone?
Without a demand for relief, the issue of standing would not present a
justiciable controversy, legal or equitable.
In conclusion, this author appraises the decision as follows: The
majority's reasoning appears sound and is easily followed; but the premise
that the derivative action is of a dual nature, upon which the court's
reasoning is based, can be disputed. Taking this into consideration, as
well as the problems attendant to jury trials in complicated corporate
litigation, the minority view might have resulted in a better decision.
At any rate, the following suggestion is submitted to those defendants
desirous of circumventing the effects of the instant case.
A defendant, faced with a demand on the part of the shareholders
for a jury trial, can probably avoid having the bulk of the issues go to
the jury by asserting the affirmative defense that the shareholder lacks
standing to litigate. Such a defense should allege that there has been no
breach of the fiduciary duty owed the corporation by the officers and
directors. If the allegations in the answer are couched in the proper
terms, they will require the judge to weed through and decide nearly
every issue of fact relevant to the corporation's claim for relief." Even
if the shareholder's standing to litigate is established, the doctrine of
collateral estoppel will prevent any of these same issues from later going
to the jury. Of course, the success of this technique will depend largely
on the nature and complexity of the claim asserted on behalf of the cor-
poration as well as the skillful drafting of the answer.4 5
CHARLES C. KLINE
44. This may not operate in the Ninth Circuit due to the effects of DePinto v.
Provident Security Life Ins. Co. 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963). See note 41 supra.
45. When there is no genuine issue of any material fact, the corporation may move
for summary judgment and achieve the same result.
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